Apollo experience report:  Command and service module communications subsystem by Lattier, E. E., Jr.
N A S A  TECHNICAL NOTE /f? - p i  
~ N A S & - - - :  5 2-7585) AEOLLC E X E E B I E I C E  174-1bS60 
SEEOKT;  C C a C A Y C  AND SERVICE E O D U L E  
:.df¶C¶UIICATICIS SUBSTSTEH (NASA) 29 p BC 
$3 -00 CSCL 228 Unclas 
HI131 29217 
APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT - 
COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE 
COMMUNICATIONS SUBSYSTEM 
by Edward E. Lattie,; Jr. 
Lyndon B. Johnsolt Space Cerzter 
Horrston, Texas 7705 8 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTOH, D. C. FEBRUARY 19 i4  
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19740008447 2020-03-23T12:50:59+00:00Z
12GGIcmmcnt-NO 1 3. Rccrpcnr's Qukq No. I 
4 Title .nd SuWrrlc 1 5. RWLWI bn 
APOLU) EXPERIENCE REPORT lebrurJ 197b 
COMMAND .QXD SERVICE LI9DULE COMMUNICATIONS 6. Pcrfamrrq m z a t r c m  Codr 
SUBSYSTEM 
The  deve!opment of spacecraf t  c o n ~ m u n i c ~ t i o ~ s  hardware f r o m  d e s i p  t o  operation is described.  
P r o g r a m s ,  r e q u i r e n ~ e n t s ,  specifications, a d  design ;npproaches f o r  a var tety of functions (such 
as voice, te lemetry,  television, and antennas)  a r e  reviewed. Equipment environn;ental p rob lems  
such  as vibration. e x t r e m e  tempera ture  variation, and z e r o  gravi ty &re discussed.  A review of 
the development of managerial  techniqties used in refining the r o l e s  of p r ime  and subcontractors  
is included. The hardware t e s t  program is descr ibed  in detai l  a s  i t  p r ~ g r e s s e d  f r o m  b r e a d l a r d  
d c s i p  to  manned flight sys tem evaluations. Finally, a s e r i e s  of act ions i s  recommended i o  
managers  of s i m i l a r  p ro jec t s  t o  facilitate administrat ion.  
7 AYthorirl 
Edward E. Lat t ier ,  Jr., JSC 
- 
9. 6ktwm.r C*pnanf son N a n  rd Mdrrn 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Cente r  
Houston, T e x a s  5 7058 
12. !+n-iswnp Apacy Name d M s r  
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Washin@on, D. C. 20546 
8 Pntammg Orpminrm R e m t  luo 
JSC S-367 
10. Work Urvt No 
I 
I 
914-11 -00-00-72 
1 1  Contract or Grant No 
1 
!3. Type of R m  nd Paled Corned 
Techniczl Note 
Id sxnr.r~ly Ageoo Codc --I i 
15. S u p d m t a q  NAIU 
T h e  J.? l r ec tor  waived the use of the International System of Units (SI) f o r  t h i s  Apollc Ex- 
perience Report because, in h i s  judgment, the use  of 8 units woulrl impai r  the usefulness  of 
the r e p ~ r t  o r  resu l t  in excessive cost.  
- 
I 
16. an=. 
I 
I- 17. Key Words , S I ~ C C ! C ~  DV A u t h ( s l )  18. O1r'r8butmn Slate.mnt 
Cornr~rmicrt i?n Equipment 'Antenna Design 
' Electronip Equipment T e s t s  
' Project Management 
' Product Cevel3pment 
' Redundant Ccn>por.ents 
I None 
Cat. 31 
27 ] $3.0- 
19 S a u r ~ t y  C. st1 lo! ih~s report1 ; 23. Seruritv CIamf. (of th~s wgcl 21 NO of P- 22 Race 
CONTENTS 
Section 
S m Y  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 
INTRODUCmON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 
BACKGROUZri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  PROGRAMP LAN 3 
DESIGN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4 
Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4 
Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Evaluation Techniques 5 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM SUMMARY 5 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  BLOCK I TO BLOCK I1 CHANGES 7 
DEVELOPMENTAL TESTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8 
Developmental Tests  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8 
. . .  Electrical, Electronic, and Electr3mechani:al Part-Evaluation Program 10 
Qualification Testi2g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10 
Design Proof Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10 
Mission-Life -Simulation Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11 
MA-TOR GROUND TESTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12 
SpacecraftTests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12 
Thermal-Vacuum Tests  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12 
Water-Impact arid Postlanding Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  I FLIGHT-TEST REQUlREhIENTS 13 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  MANNED FLIGHT EXPERIENCE AND RESULTS 16 
t 
INLINECHANGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17 
pRB(3EDNG PAGE BLMJK NOT FUU 
i ii  
Section Page 
The S-Band Squelch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Pad Communications 17 
Up-Data Link Interface With the Command Module Computer . . . . . . . . .  17 
Very -High- Frequency Ranging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18 
. . . . . .  MAJOR DESIGN. DEVELOPMENT. AND PRODUCTION PROBLEMS 18 
TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21 
Contractor Responsibilities Compared With Subcontractor 
Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Subsystem Functional Requirements 22 
CGNCLUDING REMARKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22 
REFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22 
TABLE 
Table page 
I COMMUNICATIONS SUBSYSTEM EQLTTPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6 
Figure page 
1 Typical schedule for design-verification tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9 
. . . . . . . . . . . .  2 Time phasing of subsystem test-development logic 14 
. . . . . . . . . .  3 Subsystem test-development logic. milestone oriented 15 
APOLLO EXPER I ENCE REPORT 
COMMAND AND SERVl CE MODULE COMMUNICATIONS SUBSYSTEM 
By Edward E. Lattier, Jr. 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
SUMMARY 
The development of a versati le and highly reliable communication system was re- 
quired for the Apollo Program. This communications system had to  provide ~WG-way 
voice communications and data transfer between the ea r th  and the spacecraft; t ransmis- 
sion of television from the s ~ c e c r a f t  to the earth; a capability for  precise tracking of 
the spacecraft; voice and data exchange among the earth, the command module in lunar 
orbit,  the lunar modu!~, and the extravehicular astronauts on the lunar surface; acd 
dirzction finding and voice communications during recovery operations. Reliability, 
safety, and simplicity were emphasized in the basic desipn. Minimum size and weight, 
minimum power consumption, and extended operation under a l l  mission-environment 
conditions a l so  were essential  design considerations. The primary communications 
system was t o  operate in the S-band frequency spectrum, with very-high frequency used 
fo r  communications between the command and lunar modules and the extravehicular 
astronauts and for recovery operations. Early in the Apollo Program, a concept of 
inflight maintenance gave way to one of h i l t - i n  reliability and redundancy. T b  redun- 
dancy concept proved to be more feasibie because of space and weight limitati, s. De- 
velopment of the communications system progressed through the logical development 
cycles: initial basic design through engineering evaluation; design-verification, envi- 
ronment, and mission-life testing; and flight operation. The high-gain antenna was the 
only major development problem associated with the communication system for  the 
ApoEo Program. 
The command and service  module (CSM) communications system was designed to 
provide communications between the CSM and the Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN), 
between the CSM and the lunar module (LM), and between the CSM and the extravehicu- 
lar (EV) crewmen. In this document, the development of the CSM communications sys-  
tem is reviewed from the initial concepts to the operational system used on the Apollo 11 
mission. 
The Space Task Group, organized in October 1958, developed the requirement for  
a communications system that could provide two-way transmission of audio, video, data, 
control, and tracking information that was essential  to the success  of the lunar-landing 
program. The performance functions included in the system were defined more easily 
than the physical configuration and the circuit  parameters  of the equipment. 
Before meaningful work on the design and development of an effective communica- 
tions system could begin, i t  was necessary to define the requirements. Then, i t  was 
necessary t o  delineate the functions that were  required; to determine the limitations of 
size, weight, shape, and power consumption; and t o  establish the c r i t e r i a  for reliabil- 
ity and environment. 
BACKGROUND 
Feasibility study contracts fo: an  advanced manned spacecraft were awarded in 
late 1960. In mid-1961, requests fo r  proposals (RFP) for  the spacecraft were  given 
to 12 companies that had shown a n  interest. 
The conlmunications subsystem described in the statement of work submitted 
with iiie RFP consisted of the following components. 
1. Telemetry equipment 
2. A very-high-frequency (vhf) transmitter  and receiver 
3. An intercommunications system 
4. A near-field transceiver 
5. Television 
6. A C-band transponder 
7. An alt imeter and rendezvous radar  
8. A minitrack beacon 
9. A high-frequencv (hf)/vhf recovery system 
10. A deep-space communications system (S-band) 
11. Antennas 
The communications subsystem, together with the instrume~ltation subsystem, was used 
to perform the following basic functions. 
1. Provide information for monitoring spacecraft integrity, operation of space- 
craf t  systems, and the condition of the crewmen during a l l  opra t iona l  phases 
2. Provide precision tracking 
3. Provide information essential  to  a successful spacecraft recovery 
4. Provide two-way voice communications among the ea r th  stations, the space- 
craft ,  and the lunar module 
PROGRAM PLAN 
The prime contractor for  the CSM was selected in November 1961. The commu- 
nications subsystem specifications included the following components. 
1. Voice-co~municat ions  equipment 
2. Telemetry equipment 
3. Tracking transponders 
4. Television 
5. Radio recover:; a ids  
6. Antenna subsystems 
7. Radio al t imeter 
In December 1961, the CSM prime contractor selected the comrr-unications and 
data subsystem contractor. The contract statement of work, awarded in Zanuary 1962, 
identified the following five major phases of a development and tes t  plan. 
1. Design information and developmental t e s t s  
2. Qualification, reliability, and integration t e s t s  
3. Major ground t e s t s  
4. Major development flight t e s t s  
5. Missions 
The initial program plan was  designed for  a telecommunications system that was  
subdivided into four equipment groups: the radio-frequency (rf) equipment group, the 
data equipment group, the intercommunications equipment group, and the antenna equip- 
ment group. The rf equipment group consisted of the vhf/frequency modulation (FM) 
t ransmitter ,  a resea rch  and development v h f / F ' ~  transmitter ,  a vhf/amplitude modula- 
tion (AM) t ransmitter-receiver,  a C-band transponder, unified S-band equipment, a vhf 
recovery beacon, an hf transceiver,  and a rendezvous radar  transponder. The data 
equipment group consisted of the up-data link (UDL), pulse-code-modulation (PCM) te-  
lemetry, a prernodulation processor (PMP), and television equipment. The intercom- 
munications group included an audio center, microphones and earphones, and three 
audio control panels located adjacent to each of the three couch positions. The antenna 
equipment group included two vhf/2-gigahertz onlnidirectional antennas, two vhf recov- 
e r y  antennas, an hf recovery antenna, a 2-gigahertz high-gain antenna (HGA), four 
C-band beacon (transponder) antennas, and a rendezvous-radar transponder antenna. 
In addition, various antenna switches, re lease  and deployment mechanisms, a vhf mul- 
tiplexer, gimbal drives,  servosystems,  and sensors  were included in the antenna equip- 
ment group. 
DESIGN 
Equipment changes resulted from program philosophy changes, new mission r e -  
quirements, o r  normal development. From the outset, simplicity, safety, and rel ia-  
hility were  emphasized in the basic design approach. The equipment and the sys t tm 
were tc; be sufficiently versati le  to allow additional capabilities as new requirements 
were developed. 
Approach 
Performance and reliability were  the f i r s t  considerations in the selection of par ts  
and materials. Those par ts  that had already been approved by Specification MIL-E-5400 
were investigzted f i rs t .  When a reduction in s ize  and weight o r  an improvement in per-  
formance, reliabilitv, o r  simplicity of design could be realized, alternative par ts  were  
considered. Systems would be solid state unless prohibited by state -of -the-art factors,  
power, frequency, o r  s imi lar  considerations. The use of toxic, combustible, o r  foul- 
smelling materials  was  prohibited uniess the mater ia ls  were contained within sealed 
o r  potted enclosures. The equipment was  designed to operate above and below the ex- 
pected ambient-temperature ranges, with minimum reliance on external  cooling. 
Requirements 
The equipment design excluded a s  many panel meters ,  switches, and connectors 
a s  possible. The construction was  designed f o r  easy maintenance. Each system was 
a s  nearly self-contained as possible to facilitate r e n ~ o v a l  f rom the spacecraft.  Con- 
nectors were left unpotted, t. .opt where necessary to conform t o  other reliability and 
design requirements, and previsions were made to  ensure that connectors could not be 
mated in~proper ly  .
The  communication^ sribsystem was compatible with the primary power system of 
the spacecraft. Each component was  capable of ccirnplet. recovery within 1 second after  
a momentary power interruption, was  protected against i i~omentary overvoltage o r  un- 
dervoltage and interruptions, and was  capable of sustained operation within plus 
15-percent o r  minus 20-percent variation f rom normal voltage. Power consumption 
was  minimized. 
The design requirements a lso  stated that mechanical and electr ical  interchange- 
ability must exist hztween like assemblies,  subassemblies, and replacement par ts  
whenever practical. The replacement part  did not have to be identical physically, hut 
it had to  fit without physical o r  e lec t r ica l  modification of any part  of the equipment or  
assemblies (including cabling, wiring, and mounting). 
The equipment was  designed fo r  maximum pzotection against generated interfer-  
ence. Generation of radio interference by the total subsystem or  by any component, 
and the vulnerability of the system t o  such interference (whether conducted o r  radiated), 
were  controlled in accordance with program-developed specifications. 
To increase the reliability and to minimize the number of plug-in units carr ied  
by the crewmen, redundancy was  designed into the subsystem wherever feasible. Sub- 
stitute assemblies and sys tems were  activated by maliual switching. 
Eval uation Techniques 
The equipment and associated documentation were engineered fo r  comprehensive 
and logical fault tracing, and the subsystem contained sufficient monitor points to allow 
rapid and complete sys tems checks. The equipment and the subsystem were designed 
s o  that prelaunch tests ,  before and af ter  mating with the launch vehicle, could be com- 
pleted readily without significant effect on other onboard systems. The uncoupling of 
system connections and the introduction of test  cabling fo r  these checkogts were kept 
to  a minimum. Functional evaluation of the system was performed by the contracto:'; 
however, an early,  unpotted, operating prototype system with the drawings, diagrams, 
and other pertinent documentation was  provided to t5e NASA f o r  review and evaluation. 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM SUMMARY 
The objec3ve of the development program was to provide a conimu;lications sub- 
system design to support the Apollo lunar-landing mission. Ear ly  in the program, a 
basic sul'vstc m design was  established to  satisfy specific communications functions 
and data-hanuiing-capability requirements. These requirements were  investigated in 
depth and resulted in detailed equipment specifications. 
A major design change point divided the development program into Block I and 
Block I1 spacecraft. Although cer ta in  functional design changes were made f o r  the 
Block I1 comniunications subsystem, the basic c h a n y  was in the mechanical configura- 
tion. Inflight-replaceable modular-type equipment was replaced with sealed units that 
had built-in and switchable redundancy. 
The Block J and Block I1 subsystems that evolved consisted of two basic gr3ups 
of equipment: tile electronic packages that had colnnion environmental requirenleat.3 
were located in the command module (CM), and the antennas that had individual envi - 
ronmental requirements were located external  to the CSM. This hardware is ident i f id  
in table 1. 
The development of the individual equipment parameters  was based on the total 
communications subsystem requirements. The interface parameters ,  defined in the 
equipment specifications, were validated and verified in laboratory subsystem tes ts  
TABLE I. COMM dMCATIONS SUBSYSTEM EQUIPMENT 
a Used only on spacecraft (SC) 017 and 020. 
- 
Equipment I Block I Block I1 -. 
Internal 
vhf/l?M transS.litter 
hf transceiver 
v h f / A ~  transmlrter-receiver 
vhf recovery beacon 
C-band transponder 
Unified S-band equipment 
S-band power amplifier 
Audio center equipment 
PCM telemetry 
Premodulation processor 
vhf multiplexer 
vhf triplexer 
Up-data link 
vhf antenna switch 
S-band a n t e n n ~  switch 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
2; 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
-I 
I 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
External 
X 
X 
X 
X 
High-gain antenna 
hf recovery antenna 
vhf/uhf scimitar -notch antennas 
C-band antennas 
S-band omnidirectional antennas 
vhf scimitar -notch antenna 
vhf recovery antennas 
X 
X 
X 
(a) 
X 
conducted by the major subcontractor a s  part of the ground test program. Further lab- 
oratory tests were performed at the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC), for- 
merly the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), to establish spacecraft-to-ground-station 
compatibility. However, the development through qualification testing was on zn indi- 
vidual equipment basis. 
Initially, equipment development to establish basic 2lectrical design was in the 
form of breadboards. Then, brassboard units were constructed without the use of for- 
mal drawings by engineering personnel. These units established the basic electrical 
and mechanical design for subsequent equipment-level testing. Formal drawings, re-  
sulting from the brassboard program, were used to construct engineering models. 
Because design changes were expected a s  a result of testing the brassboard and engi- 
neering models, materials and process controls were relaxed. These models were 
restricted from use on flight spacecraft. The models were used to verify the equip- 
ment design in early subsystem laboratory tests and, on the in-house spacecraft to 
establish the validity of test procedures and equipment for use with flight hardware. 
Final-design models were produced under close control and were used for ground 
and flight spacecraft and for qualification testing. QualiCicatioc tests  were based on the 
expected flight environments and were completed before the flight oi similar equipment 
in a spacecraft. 
Block 11 redesign varied with individual equipment. Experience with the Block I 
models allowed Block I1 development to proceed immediately with brassboard models 
that were usable a s  engineering models. Design progressed from the brassboard 
models directly to production flight hardware. Preproduction units were fabricated for 
use in ground tests. 
Subsystem tests  in ground spacecraft were performed concurrently with qualifica- 
tion testing to verify the compatibility of the equipment with the 9tal spacecraft system. 
Conducting these tests  in the in-house spacecraft allowed the su, system functions to 
support tes ts  on other subsystems. 
The flight tests were performed after the equipment qualification and ground tests 
to eatsure that the subsystem would meet the Izquirements of space operations. Un- 
manned flights qualified the portion of the subsystem that was required for manned 
earth-orbital flights. The total subsystem was flight qualified before lunar operations 
were begun. 
BLOCK I TO BLOCK I I CHANGES 
During the Mercury 9 (MA-9) flight, electrical wiring problems were encountered. 
The cause of these problems was determined to be contaminants (water, urine, sweat, 
and so forth) migrating to  exposed electrical terminals. After an investigation of the 
Apollo electrical system, the decision was made to seal all  electrical wiring and con- 
nectors from the internal spacecraft environment. The Block I Apollo hardware was 
already designed and built in accordance with the inflight maintenance concept, which 
meant that many module-to-black-box connectors and self -mating black-box-to- 
spacecraft connectors were used. The subcontractor attempted to "humidity proof" 
connectors, but this attempt was lengthy and not very effective. The resulting equip- 
, 
ment configuration eliminated almost any possibility of inflight maintenance. 
In late 1963, the inflight maintenance concept was changed in favor of built-in and 
switchable redundancy and backup modes to achieve the desired reliability and program 
I requirements. Concurrently (early 1964), the commu~~icat ions  subsystem functional 
i requirements were  reexamined, resulting in required design changes. It was deter-  mir,ed that new packaging techniques would allow for  the new required functional changes 
and that completely sealed units could be built that satisfied the redundancy require- 
ments within the weight and volume allcwed. The re ; -a t  was the Block I1 communica- 
tions subsystem. The Block I and Block I1 communications subsystems differed in the 
following three major a s p c t s .  
I 1. Equipment not considered neces?. .-y to  the lunar-landing mission was elimi- 
nated from the Block II requirements. 
2. Deficiencies noted in the Bioc:; I design were corrected in the Block Il ciesiw. 
3. New equipment was added because of the requirement for  combined LM/CSM 
operations and the lunar-landing mission. 
The eliminated equipment consisted of the v h f / F ~  transmitter  and the C-band t rans-  
ponder, the functions of which were absorbed by the S-band equipment (that is, data 
transmission and ranging). In addition, the hf transceiver and antenna also wc :e 
dropped from the program. 
The major deficietlcy was the ineffective humidity protection. Correcting th is  
deficiency involved repackaging the boxes located in the lower equipment bay w.d r e -  
placing self-mating connectors with screw-on-type connectors. 
DEVELOPMENTAL TEST1 NG 
The objectives of the developmental (D model) testing were to  validate the design 
a p ~ r o a c h ,  t o  develop the final operation21 design, and to onsare that delivered equip- 
ment would meet the design requirements. 
Developmental Tests 
Developmental t e s t s  were performed ear ly  in the design phase on equipment, 
modules, circuits, and components to determine the feasibilit) of the circui: jesign, 
mechanical design, component application, 2nd s o  forth. All developmental tes ts  (elec- 
trical, t::ormal, and vibrational) were performed by the subcontractor design engireers.  
After the electrical  design had been established with breadboards and brassboard 
models, the com~onents  were packaged in a manner s imilar  to the expected final con- 
figuration. Tests  were conducted on these "preproduction" models to obtain informa- 
tion on the effects of component placement on electrical, thermal, and vibrational 
characteristics. The fhgnt-qualifiable-modei design was established by usins infor.,~a- 
tion obtained in the developttiental tests. 
The desigm-verification tes ts  determined that the equipment niet operational re- 
quirenaents when subjected t o  selezted environments. These t e s t s  included prel imL~ary-  
design proof tests and parts-application tests. All design-verification t es t s  were 
conducted by the manufacturer of the equipment. A typical t ime phasing of the design- 
verification tes? program i s  shown in figure 1. Portions of these tests we;-e repeated, 
a s  required, at any design-change point. 
Figure 1. - Typical scl~edule for design-verification tests. 
Preliminary-design p r m i  tes ts  were performed by the subcontractor design engi- 
neers  on two early engineering (E) models of each major functional assembly. The 
tes ts  included functional t e s t s  under laboratory conditions and normal line voltage, 
high- and low-line-voltage tests ,  environmental tests, and electromagnetic interference 
(EMI) tests. The objectives of tne preliminary-design proof t e s t s  were to  evaluate high- 
and low-line-voltage functional operation, to  demonstrate the capability of the equipment 
to o x r a t e  under environmental requirements, and to meet the EM1 requirements a s  
cited in each equipment specilication. 
Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical 
Part-Eval uation Program 
The part-evaluation program was conducted t o  ensure the elimination of all par ts  
not adequate f o r  mission requirements. P a r t s  with limited test  o r  experience data were 
subjected t o  an approval test  program. The purpose oi the part-approval t e s t s  was to 
determine if the part  ~ o u l d  meet the rcquirernnnts, ei ther electrical, mechanical, o r  
corrbinations of : ~ t h ,  that were imposed by environmental conditions under which t;.e 
part would opezate. The cri terion wqs an adequate measure gf safety. 
Qualification Testing 
The qualification-test program for  the communications equipment was divlded into 
Block I and Block II test  programs. The Blwk I test  program was oriented to support 
the ear ly  unmanned and manned flights restr icted to .lear. ear th  operations. The 
R l x k  I1 test  program was oriented t o  support manned lunar missions. 
The qualification-test program was accon.ghshed by using two sets of communica- 
tions subsystem equipment for both the Block I and Block Il tests. One set  of equipment 
was  subjected t o  design proof tests. The other sz t  was subjected to  mission-life- 
simulation tests. The Apollo Program ground rules  for these tes ts  required that thz 
design proof t e s t s  be conducted a t  the design-!lmit environmental levels and that the 
life t e s t s  be conducted a t  normal er-*irocmenta; levels. 
Llesign Proof Tests 
In the design proof tests, ar t ic les  were subjected tcj sequentially applied environ- 
ments a t  maximum expected levels f o r  a typical Apollo mission. The tes t  sequence 
duplicated (where practical) the environments to which the equipment would be exposed, 
including the ground-environment, lift-off; orbital, entry, and recovery phases. The 
environments were aaplied a t  the individual b l a c k - t m  level t o  test  fo r  satisfactory per- 
formance under any single worst-case condition. Design proof t e s t s  consisted of the 
expcrsure of one set  of equipment t o  tlic following environments. 
Vibration. - A 5-minute vibration test  per axis was conducted for launch-abort 
conditions. The vibration levels simulated the booster-induced environment fo r  normal 
and abor t  conditions. To provide an adeqwte vibration margin, the exposures lasted 
s ix  to eight t imes  longer than expected. No vibrations simulating other sources  were 
applied b e c a u s ~  these vibrations would be well below the booster-vibration level. 
Temperature and voltage. - Temperature and vzltage t es t s  were divided into oper- 
ating a l d  :onoperating tests. The nonoperating t es t s  included temperature extremes 
ex+cted duri6q transportation in an  unheated airplane compartment and temperature 
extremes expectcd during storage in an  uncooled warehousc. In these cases ,  the equip- 
ment was required only to operate properly after  exposure. During the operating por- 
tion of the test, the t en~pera tu re  2xtremes expected for  flight and entry conditions were 
simulated. Mn:imum operating voltage was applied during the high-temperature period, 
and minimum voltage was applied during the low-temperature per'd. 
Electromagnetic mterference. - 'fhe f i r s t  part  of the EM1 tes t s  consisted of meas- 
uring the spurious voltages transmitted by wires  (conducted) and the fields emitted 
(radiated) from each iiem of equipment. It was required that measured values be less 
than n.aximum specified values. The second part of the EM1 tes ts  was a demonstration 
of the capability of the equipment to operate within tolerance in the presence of con- 
ducted and radiated interference. 
Shock. - Shock tes t s  were conducted to  simulate landing shoc-k. All equipment was 
-- 
required to  remain intact (that is, not create  projectiles that could injure the crewmen). 
Only that equipment required to operate aftel* splashdown was required to  operate within 
toierance af ter  exposure to a 78g shock environment. 
Expl~sion.  - During the explosion tests ,  the equipment was required to  operate in 
a 100-percent-oxygen (5 psia) environment without causing an explosion o r  f ire.  
Acceleration. - Each piece of equipment was csposed to 20g acceleration to s im- 
ulate worst-case entry conditions. Operation witNn specification was required after  
exposure. 
Vacuum. - Vacuum tes ts  consisted of 100 hours of vacuum (1 x lo-' to r r )  to  sim- 
ulate the pressure  loss  that would result  from a spacecraft environmental control sys-  
tem failure o r  a rupture of the spacecraft shin. 
Corrosive contamir,ant oxygen humidity. - The equipment was esposed to 48 hours 
of a 1-percent sa l t  spray during this test. This spray introduced the maxinium contam- 
ination expected from human perspiration duri.ig an A p l l o  missio-i. The salt  accumu- 
lated during this test  was  not removed before t h ~  remaining t e s t s  w e ~ - e  conducted. 
Then, the equipment was exposed to dry oxygen fo r  50 hours LO simulate the f i rs t  por- 
tion of a mission before humidity buildup. r'inally, the equipment was subjected to 
100-percent humidity for 240 hours and jufficient 100-percent o s y m  to  bring the total 
absolute pressure  to 5 psi. 
Mi ssion-Life-Sin~ulation Tests 
T k  purposzs of the mission-life-simulatiotl tes ts  *ere to demonstrate for  2 spec- 
ified period the eqaipmect p2rfornlance capabilities when the equipment was subjected 
to environmental s t r e s s e s  that simulated a florala1 Apollo mission. When possible, the 
t e s t s  were coniucted with combined applied envirorlments. Data gathered from the 
inissior,-life-simulation tes is  included component capability, conlbined-environments 
capability, life characteristics, and, for  Block 11, repeatability. The f i rs t  cycle in- 
cluded exposure to the following conditions. 
! . Room ambient conditions (250 hours) with equipment operating, simulated 
&rol:nci checkout of the snacecraft a t  the contractor facility and a t  the NASA John F. 
Kennedy Space Center. 
2. Vibration (15 minutes) in each axis simulated nominal expected lift-off 
vibration. 
3. Room ambient  conditions (336 hours)  sinlulated the spacecraft  environment. 
During this  period, tne equipment was sprayed with a 1-percent s a l t  solution once eve ry  
24 hours.  
An e l ec t r i ca l  acceptance t e s t  was  performed a t  the conclusion of the previous s teps .  A 
second cycle, identical to the f i r s t  test  except for  ground checkout, w a s  perfornwd on 
each  tes t  a r t ic le .  
MAJOR GROUND TESTS 
The  following y - o u n ~  res ts  were  conducted to verify the fli@it capability of the 
comnlunications subsystem. 
Spacecraft Tests 
Spacecraft compatibility. - In-house spacecraf t  t e s t s  were  needed to  verify the 
compatibility of spacecraf t  subsys tems and subsystenls  operation with ground-support 
equipment and to  allow e a r l y  identification of problems associated with installation and 
checkout procedures.  The  in-house spacecraf t  provided a means of defining and solving 
problems associated with flight spacecraf t  without endangering the fliqht hardware. 
The  Block I in-house spacecraf t  w a s  the boilerplace 14  (BP-14) spacecraft .  Th i s  
spacecraf t  was equipped with engineering-model communications equipmellt and w a s  
constructed f o r  easy  a c c e s s  t o  the installed equipment with t e s t  and checkout equipment. 
Satisfactory completion of the BP-14 t e s t s  w a s  requi red  'before the unmannr spacecraf t  
flights. 
Acoustic and vibration. - The spacecraft  was  subjected to acoust ic  and vibration 
tests .  The requi rements  using Block I hardware were  supported by spacecraf t  (SC) 006. 
The data obtained verified that the spacecraft  communications equipment would not be 
subjected to vibration levels  in flight that would esceed  design and qualification levels .  
Satisfactory con~ple t ion  of these t e s t s  was  reqvired before the planned manned Block I 
flights. 
Thermal-Vacuum Tests 
Block I tes t s .  - Thermal-vacuum te s t s  were  performed on SC 008 in a manned 
configuration, and the t e s t s  verified the habitabilily of the spacecraft .  The  t e s t s  a l s o  
verified equipment and spacecraft  subsystenis  i o r  Block I manned flights. 
Block 11 t es t s .  - The ma jo r  change in the configuration of the subsystem installa- 
tion requi. ?d that the thermal-vacuum t e s t s  conducted on SC 008 (Block 1 configuration) 
be repeated on Block II configuration spacecraf t  by using SC 2TV-1. The inermal-  
vacuum t e s t s  were  completed successful ly before the Block I1 manned flights. 
Water- l mpact and Podlandicg Tests 
The portions of the communications subsystem that were used as postlanding r e -  
co l t  ry  aids were subjected to water-impact and postlanding tes ts  under controlled con- 
di th .11~ during the SC 007 drop tes ts  and the BP-29 flotation tests. Equipment 
perf ~ r m a n c e  was evaluated with respect  to design cr i ter ia  for the recovery aids. The 
I V , ~ !  r-impact and postlanding t es t s  were completed successfully before the unmanned 
13 c k I flights. 
FL l GHT-TEST REQUIREMENTS 
Fu~~ci iona l  nd mechanical performance verification (especially during boost con- 
ditions) of the scimitar-notch (SCIN) vhf/2-gigahertz antenna (Block I, SC 002) was r e -  
rlui -ed before the unmanned Block I missions. Verification was obtained by monitoring 
tltv performance of the antenna during the SC 002 tumbling-abort mission a t  the White 
!h is Missile Range. 
Verification that the communications subsystem would perform within the pre- 
dicted circuit margins during suborbital and orbital flights was required before mannzd 
flight. The Block I subsystem was considered qualified for  manned flight af ter  satis-  
fact :wy comparison of the actual and the predicted performance data taken from the 
f i rs r  two unmanned flights (desibmated SC 009 and SC 011). 
Because the Block 11 vhf and S-band omnidirectional antennas differed from the 
Bloc!: I antennas in configuration and location, it was necessary to flight qualify the 
Blr,cl: I1 equipment. The las t  two Block I spacecraft, desi~gnated SC 017 and SC 020 
,:u~,m:;.nned), were flown a t  entry velocities that simulated lunar-return conditions for 
.om1 spacecraft qualification, with emphasis on the Block I1 heat-shield-qualification 
~ h a s e .  The Block 11 vhf and S-band omnidirectional antennas were installed in the two 
pa~:e.:raft. The antennas were considered qualified for nlanned Block 11 flights af ter  
corr,pb:tion of tk SC 017 and SC 020 flights. 
The Block I1 communications equipment was considered qualified for  manned 
ea r th -~rb i t a l  flights after  completion of the Block I flight qualification, the Block I1 
qualification program, and the ground tests .  The Block I1 communications subsystem 
was c ol~sidered flight qualified for the lunar mission after  i t  had been demonstrated 
that ilight performance met the predicted performance on a manned earth-orbital flight 
The 1irr.e phasing and logic of the communications subsystem development a r e  shown in 
f igures 2 and 3. 
:inr lhwq 
7 
l obZ I963 lPar 1965 1% la' 1 ISS 
I 
1 i 1 I 
S u ~ l r r c l a  q-hEP f 7  v 
t 
9-ly B W  l
1 
')trtlgg"tnU krts Blat 1 
I 
Build ad IeU f -nodcls E r n  1 twl l l l  
I 
I 
I 
BuiM .nd UP B I M  I1 I 
b m ~  asdclr 
Pt&* -1 r r l r  
~ ~ w * a y  u r ~ j l t -  Wsr 
Buildrrd 0-madclr I I tpuigrrnr WatIICmOn WIII 
Croun: Igrccr*l 
BP-14 
\C ms 
SC (IR 
SC am 
-- 
A sc OII 
Fkgure 2. - Time phasing of subsyslenl test-development logic. 
Figure 3.  - Subsystem test-development logic, milestone oriented. 
As a result  of the communications subsystem performance on SC 009, 011, 017. 
and 020 (all unmanned and using Block I black boxes and Block I and Block I1 omnidirec - 
tional antennas) and the performance on the Block I1 equipment qualification and ground 
tests, the subsystem was considered qualified to support manned earth-orbital flight. 
Acceptable performance on thls Qpe of mission qualified the subsystem to support 
lunar -distance missions. 
The Apollo 7 mission (SC 101) was a manned, 10. &day, earth-orbital mission. 
.I. complete communications subsystenl (without the HGA) was flown on this mission. 
Virtually a l l  communications modes and ftlnctions were exercised, and the performance 
a x  evaluated. With m k o r  exceptions, t d ! l  s u b s p s ~ e m  performance was nominal. The 
r!GA was not flown on this mission for several  reasons: the HGA was not required on 
ar. earth-orbital mission and only a minimal checkout of the HGA could be perfornied 
in ear th  orbit.  
The Apollo 8 mission (SC 103) w&s a manned, 6.1 -day, lunar-orbital mission. 
With the exception of the emergency key mode, every comn~unications mode was veri-  
fied in flight. The HGA was used for the f i r s t  time on this mission, and i t  performed 
normally. Special automatic reacquisition t es t s  were performed to e-.-aluate spacecraft 
shadowing and reflection characterist ics on the HGA operation. Dui ;t~g the translunar 
and transearth coast phases of the mission, the spacecraft was oriented properly with 
respect  to the sun and was rolled t!) achieve the passive thermal-control mode. Essen- 
tially continuous communications were maintained while in this mode by ground- 
command switching be tween two diametrically opposed S- band omnidirectional antennas. 
The success  of this method verified the feasibility of this procedure for a l l  subsequent 
missions. 
The Apollo 9 mission (SC 104) was a manned, 10-day, earth-orbital mission and 
included the f i r s t  use of a manned LM. Conimunication subsystem performance was 
nominal except for -. time period when the UDL real-time-command functions wer-  in- 
operable. No definite cause for the discrepancy was found, although extensive post- 
flight t e s t s  and analyses were performed. The Apollo 9 mission provided the f i r s t  
opportunity to  use and evaluate the performance of the vhf communications ca2ability 
between the CSM and the 5M. The voice and data link fulfilled the intended function of 
the communications system on this mission. 
The Apollo 10 mission (SC 106) was  a manned, 8-day, lunar-orbital micsion and 
war  the f i r s t  lunar-orbital mission using the combined spacecraft (CSM and LM). The 
HGA.was used extensively in various modes otl the Apollo 10 mission, and the HGA per- 
formance met a l l  the requirements. As was done on the Apollo 8 mission, special r e -  
flectivity t e s t s  were conducted using the HGA. The resul ts  indicated the possibility of 
automatic-acquisition interference because of service module (SM) reflections for  look- 
angles near the positive X-axis. 
The communications subsystem performance on a l l  the manned flights before the 
lunar-landing mission (Apollo 11) did not indicate the need for any functional o r  param- 
e te r  changes. These flights proved that the communications subsystem was compatible 
with other spacecraft subsystems, with t t e  LM communications subsystem, and with 
the MSFN. Specifically, the CSM comn;unications subsystenl was considered adequate 
in a l l  respects  t o  support the lunar-landing mission. 
I NLI NE CHANGES 
Before any manned Block 11 flights, various functional changes, especially vehicle 
testing a t  the spacecraft contractor facility and on the Block I flights, were needed as a 
resul t  of ground testing. The changes were  added inline; that i s ,  changes were  imple- 
mented without delaying spacecraft delivery schedules. Equipment changes were made 
af ter  delivery to tne launch facility. The more significant changes made to the origi- 
nally conceived Block II cominunications subsystem a r e  summar;zed as follows. 
The S-Band Squelch 
If thc spacecraft S-band receiver lost phase lock o r  if the 30-kilohertz up-voice 
subcarr ier  modulation was  lost fo r  any reason, considerable wide-band noise was  e s -  
oerienced in the headsets of the crewmen. The noise was  considered objectionable, 
thus, the addition of a muting circuit  (called S-band squelch) was authorized. The 
change consisted of adding a 30-kilohertz subcarr ier  level detector driving a muting 
switch, a l l  located in the PMP. Loss of subcarr ier  o r  a low-level subcarr ier  (also 
indicative 01 receiver  unlock o r  loss  of up link) activated the nluting switch to prevent 
the resultant noise from reaching the crew me^,. This  modification was  effective on 
SC 106 and subsequent spacecraft.  
Pad Communicatior,~ 
Testing a t  the launch facility indicated that a change was needed in the spacecraft 
audio hardware to prevent spacecraft intercomn~unications interference with the launch- 
facility comnlunications. The spacecraft interconlmunications system also  was used 
a s  the hardline communications a t  the launch facility. The s p a c e c ~ d t  chanse that was  
implemented used the audio-center hf receive-transmit circuitry to  provide a complete 
four-wire capability between the spacecraft and the launch facility. This  change was 
effective on SC 103 and a l l  subsequent spacecraft.  
Up-Data Link I nterface With the 
Command Module Computer 
The input to the CM conlputer (CMC), used for  updating computer information, 
was  arranged s o  that the UDL input was paralleled ("OR" circuit  configuration) with the 
hardlines used to update the computer before launch. However, *I;ese !sng hardlines 
acted a s  antennas and picked up transients tnat caused incorrect  information to be 
entered into the CMC. The hardlines were modified by connecting tile long l ines through 
UDL relays. Thus, by ground command, the UDL could isolate the computer from the 
transients. This  change was effective on SC 106 and a l l  subsequent spacecraft.  
Very-High-Frequency Ranging 
The vhf ranging history is recorded elsewhere (ref. I), but because there was  
interface with and changes in the communications subsystem as a result  of the vhf 
ranging requirement, i t  is mentioned here. The changes caused by vhf ranging were 
minor, but did invoke return of vhf/AM transmitter-  receiver packages to the vendor 
for  modification and acceptance retesting. 
MAJOR DES I CN, DEVELOPMENT, AND 
PRODUCTION PROBLEMS 
In general, the communications subsystem had few major problems in the design, 
development, and production of the hardware. The S-band HGA was always a pacing 
item. A detailed history of the HGA with regard to the various aspects of the design, 
development, a c i  production follows. 
In February 1965, a subcontractor was selected to provide the S-band HGA for 
the CSM. The late s t a r t  is considered to have csmpounded problems that developed 
later. This subcontractor also was working on the LM steerable antenna and seemed 
to be making satisfactory prorrress up to that time. 
By October 1965, i t  became obvious that the infrarsd (IR) system being studied 
would not provide satisfactory ea r th  trac!:ing. Manv problems were associated with 
the IR t racker,  but the two major ones were the inability to acquire and track a "small 
earth" in a large field of view and the inability to track the ea r th  properly when the 
ear th  and the sun were within 5"  of each other. The subcontractor was directed to 
procecd with an rf tracking system similar to that used on the LM steerable antenna. 
Early in 1966, other problems of major proportion began to affect the HGA pro- 
gram. The initial unit greatly exceeded the allowable weight, s o  that a conlplete re- 
design was necessary. This redesign required that new par t s  be ordered,  causing 
considerable schedule slippage. The new requirement for  an automatic reacquisition 
mode increased the slippage. By August 1966, i t  was determined that the electronics 
unit, packaged in a box for installation i r i  the SM, would have to be redesigned because 
the circuit design was environmentally unstable. Testing and replacement of compo- 
nents within the box were impossible withdut destruction of ihe unit because of the 
method of construction of the modules aild the method of potting; nevertheiess, replace- 
ment of par ts  was often necessary. 
By early 1967, three units were available in various degrezs of completion. 
These units were a n  engineering model (XDV-4) that was to be usea on SC 2TV-1, the 
qualification-test unit, and model XDV-3 that would be assigned !s, SC 101, the f i r s t  
Block I1 flight spacecraft. 
In March 1967, the formal  qualification tes ts  started on XDV-4, but problems 
were experienced from the beginning. Mechanical fai lures occurred during every 
phase of the tc.st. The causes of the fai lures were  attributed to faulty materials, poor 
workmanship, design e r r o r s ,  rough handling, and ineffective quality conirol. Failures 
also occurred in the electronics, both on the antenna and within the SM electronics box. 
The entire system was extremely sensitive to temperature and humidity changes. 
By June 1967, almost every functional part  of the system had failed a t  one time 
o r  another. The 2TV-1 antenna was being used as a development model to support the 
qualification tests .  The SC 101 antenna had been removed from the spacecraft and was 
being used to support the ground test  program. The qualification-test unit had so many 
"fixes" that the validity of the data was questionable. 
Although the qualification-test procedure was completed, there were several  fail- 
u r e s  ' h t  had not been corrected. This situation necessitated a delh-qualification pro- 
gram, to be run as soon as the antenna and the electronics box could be refurbished. 
By December 1967, so many problems were associated with the program that 
progress  appeared to be a t  a standstill. A special task team was organized to aid the 
su'bcontractor in solving his problems and in making more satisfactory progress  toward 
supporting schedules. 
A program status review was presented to this task team by the subcontractor in 
mid-Decemkl 1967. The activities to date, the progress,  the problems, and the test  
programs and resul ts  (including failures and proposed future actions) were discussed 
at length. Various causes, such as the following, were determined to have contributed 
to  the schedule sl ips and hardware deficiencies. 
1 Lack of communications between subcontractor departments and personnel 
2. Unrealistic work schedules 
3. Inadequate procedures for fabrication, assembly, and testing 
The subcontractor was optimistic that outstanding problems could be solved and quali- 
fied hardware would be available to support SC 103. A follow-on review was scheduled 
for  January 31, 1968. 
From mid-December 1967 to the end of January 1968, open failures increased 
from 19 to 27, and i t  was obvious the subcontractor h s  been overly o p t i i ~ ~ i s t i c  at the 
December review. At the January 31, 1968, meeting, the subcontractor was  told that 
i t  was absolutely necessary for  subcontractor management to accept responsibility for  
meeting quality and schedale requirements. In addition, i t  was stressed that a quali- 
fied se t  of hardware be made available for SC 103. The subcontractor agreed that the 
December forecast  was optimistic, but accepted the challenge to provide quality hard- 
ware in the most expeditious mnnner possible. 
A high-level management committee, composed of representatives of the subcon- 
tractor,  the major contractor, and the MSC, was appointed and directed to  develop a 
program plan that would achieve the following tasks. 
1. Define the t e s t s  to be performed 
2. Propose equipment allocation 
3. Decide on the requirenr,?n~ :'or new qilalification test  
4. Propose a work-around-the-program p ! ~  to  deliver suitable hardware for 
SC 103 
5. Establish manpower requirements 
6. Take positive action to close out open failures 
The committee was required to review al l  problems (management, design, material, 
test, and p e r s o n ~ e l )  and to present plans of action in each area at  a top-management 
status review on February 16, 1968. 
Committee progress was reviewed on February 16 and on March 15. After the 
March 15 review, the decision was made to  eliminate the gimbal-motor brakes and to  
substitute an external mechanical means (snubbers) to  res t ra in  the antenna during the 
boost-vibration phase of the mission. It was  decided that antennas under construction 
would be furnished for use on SC 103 and SC 104. As much testing as possible to sup- 
port these m i t s  would be completed by using hardware already on hand; however, to 
support SC 106 and subsequent spacecraft, a new antenn- and e lec t rmics  b x  would be 
used for another qualification test. A l s ~ ,  i t  was announced that a full-time program ' 
manager from the contractor was being assigned to expedite the subcontractor effort 
to the maximum extent possible. 
The assembly technicians went on str ike in April 1968. To partially offset the 
effects of the str ike on the program, the contractor brought in some contractor people 
and additional people from a s:lbsidiary to ass i s t  (primarily in the design-review area).  
By this time, complete and detailed reviews of status design and documentation were 
completed o r  were in progress.  I t  was  obvious that a complete repackaging of the elec - 
tronics box was necessary i f  reliability and interchangeability were to be achieved. The 
suitability of the microwave striplines was in doubt a l so  because of the susceptibility of 
the striplines to  temperature variations. Different coefficients of expansion of the cop- 
per t races  and the polyolefin material  (of which the boards were made) resulted in cpen 
circilits in the t r aces  after  thermal cycling. 
In the succeeding months, the following specific actions were taken. 
1. It was decided that CSM 103, 104, and (possibly) 106 would be equipped with 
the electronics box of the original des ig  that used the small  module ("mule") type of 
circuitry. 
2. The electronics box was repackaged to eliminate the mules, which were sus- 
ceptible to failure during thermal s t ress .  
3. The striplines were redesigned. 
4. The labyrinth seals  on the gimbals were replaced with low-friction dust seals.  
5. All of the new equipment was requalified. 
The electronics boxes were delivered so that no serious schedule impact reoulted. 
The antenna assemblies for CSM 103 and 104 were delivered and installed after the 
spacecraft had reached the launch facility. The qualification of these units was waived, 
and the perforxxance on these two missions was considered satisfactory. The data ob- 
tained during these flights were valuable for future flight planning. 
The subcontractor also was assigned the task of repackaging the electrox~ics box. 
Although some problems developed, the new concept proved to be highly satisfactory, 
and the unit passed qr-alificaticn testing with little difficulty. 
Continuing failures of the striplines led to the decision to replace I hem with the 
new version (phase III striplines), which proved to be less  vulnerable to thermai cycling. 
Because of the late go-ahead, this modification was not effective un;il SC i39.  The an- 
tennas that were flown with the existing subcontractor striplines performed nominally 
I throughout the missions. 
The gimbal-hangup problem was traced to differential tem:.xraturc lin the 
gear train. Heat from the motors was transferred by conduction to thz k. ) i  the 
motor shaft, keeping the temperature high while the remainicg gears coo . c3n- 
tracted. This temperature difference caused the gears to bind. The overall dimensions 
of the drive gears were reduced so that they would not bind. 
Despite the HGA development and production problems, the hardware supported 
t ~ l e  lunar-landing program satisfactorily. The efforts of the various teams and person- 
nel in solving the problems a re  considered to have been iristrumental in tile resulting 
success of the HGA program. 
TECHN I CAL MANAGEMENT EXPER I ENCE 
Contractor Responsibilities Compared With 
Subcontractor Responsibilities 
I The design, development, and production of the majority of the communications 
, subsystem components were subcontracted hy the spacecraft prime contractor to a 
major subcontractor. The major subcontractor, in turn, built some of the black boxes 
in-house and subcontracted others. The remai r~kg components of the cornmunicati~ns 
subs:rstem were subcontracted by the spacecraft prime contractor to individual vendors, 
to other divisions of the spacecraft contractor, o r  were built in-house. 
It was recognized by the spacecraft contractor that the designation of z "prime" 
subcontractor allows for a centralized system approach. The subcontractor was se- 
lected not only on the basis of technical capability, but also on the basis of ability to 
combine al l  of the components into an operable subsystem. This concept proved to be 
efficient and is recommended for communications subsystems on future programs. 
Subsystem Functional Requirements 
Initial functional requirements for. the communications were determined and es -  
tablished ear ly  in the Apollo Prog . ~ m .  The subsystem was designed to  meet these 
functional requirements. As the spacecraft sys tems developed, inputs were made by 
elements of the MSC an3 other NASA centers. These unexpected functional require- 
ments resulted in n,any minor and major redesigns before a design freeze could be 
accomplished. The redesigns resulted in schedule sl ips and increased costs. The 2 -  
fore, i t  is recommended that the f ~ , ~ c t i o n a l  requirements of a l l  orgznizations be brought 
together as ear ly  as possible in the program. 
CONCLUD I NG ZMARKS 
70 determine that communications subsystem design and requirements changes 
would be desirable, a hypotiletical case was examined. Assuming that an  Apollo-type 
program was just beginping, and with the knowledge and experience of the Apollo Pro-  
gram, .driour changes were considered to be applicable. in other words, what changes 
!.? ;he present communications subsystem w o ~ l d  be recommended?  he proposals re -  
sulting from this investigation a r e  listed as foliows. 
1. Design in more dgwnvoice channels so  that the crewmen would not have to 
time-share one link. 
2. Delete the high-gain antenna medium-beam width transmit capability. 
3. Implement a two-axis gimbal system for the high-gain actenna instead cf the 
present three-axis gimbal. 
4. Delete the low-power capability in the S-band power amplifier. 
5. Install a power amplifier In close proximity to the antenna'(or antennas) to 
reduce line loss  of radio-frequency power. 
6. Provlde a means to select a l l  the spacecraft S-band antennas ,utoma:ically 
o r  by ground command (or both). 
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